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I. INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining legislation came relatively late to the public sector
in the United States. For much of the twentieth century, courts were hostile to
public employees who desired to form and join labor unions. As late as 1963,
almost three decades after enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
guaranteed private sector employees the right to form and join labor
organizations,' the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the City of Muskegon's
prohibition on its police officers joining labor unions.2 Although many public
sector unions formed primarily to represent members in civil service and
similar administrative proceedings and to lobby the government on their
members' behalf, courts equated public sector unions with their private
sector counterparts. In the judicial view of the early and mid-twentieth
century, allowing public employees to join unions would lead inevitably to
work stoppages. "[E]ven though actually existing public sector unions had all
formally renounced strikes and did not strike, and even though most were
willing to forgo traditional collective bargaining and did not engage in
traditional formal bargaining, courts insisted on seeing unions as institutions
that inevitably struck and bargained....
The fear that allowing public employees to join unions would lead
inevitably to public worker strikes can be traced to the Boston police strike of
1919.4 Frustrated by stagnated wages in a time of high inflation, intolerably
long shifts, and having to stay overnight in police stations marked by decrepit
conditions, Boston police officers secured a charter from the AFL-CIO. The
Boston police commissioner responded by prohibiting membership in the
union and suspending nineteen police officers who he believed were union
officials. The membership responded with a strike of three-fourths of the
police force. Law and order broke down for several days, particularly in
downtown Boston and South Boston. Massachusetts Governor Calvin
Coolidge mobilized the State Guard to restore order and patrol the streets
1 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
2 AFSCME Local 201 v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1963).
3 JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW
AND THE STATE 1900-1962 82 (2004).
4 This discussion of the Boston Police Strike is adapted from MARTIN H. MALIN ET
AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 216 (2011).
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while a replacement force composed primarily of World War I veterans was
recruited and trained.
"[A]lthough the Boston police strike was as atypical as it was dramatic, it
contributed far more than any other single event to the peculiarly American
view that public sector labor relations were entirely distinct from private
sector labor relations." 5 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who signed
into law the National Labor Relations Act, which grants private sector
workers a right to strike, 6 declared:
[M]ilitant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of
Government employees . . . [A] strike of public employees manifests
nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations
of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking
toward the paralysis of Government by those sworn to support it, is
unthinkable and intolerable.7
President Reagan referred to the Boston police strike when he fired
striking air traffic controllers in 1981.8 The overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions prohibit strikes by all public employees. The federal government
makes it a felony for its employees to strike.9 Even in the small minority of
jurisdictions that recognize a public employee's right to strike, employees
must meet more extensive procedural requirements before they may strike
than exist in the private sector. At times, courts in public employee right-to-
strike jurisdictions have rejected private sector rules because of a paramount
concern of minimizing the risk of work stoppages. For example, although
private sector employers may unilaterally change wages, hours, and working
conditions after they have bargained to impasse,' 0 the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court has prohibited public employers in that state from
making unilateral changes even at impasse unless the union strikes, out of
concern that unilateral changes will provoke unions to strike. 1
Declaring strikes illegal does not mean that strikes will not occur. Janet
Curry and Sheena McConnell found no significant difference in strike
5 SLATER, supra note 3, at 14.
6 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (2006).
7 Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to the president, National Federation of Federal
Employees (Aug. 16, 1937), quoted in Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 83 A.2d
482, 484 (Conn. 1951).
8 See SLATER, supra note 3, at 37.
9 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (2006).
10 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
11 Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., 620 A.2d 594 (Pa. Commw. 1993).
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incidence or duration between jurisdictions where public employee strikes
are lawful and those with no collective bargaining statute and a strike
prohibition. 12 My own study found that strike incidences actually declined
after Illinois and Ohio legalized public employee strikes in 1984.13 By far,
the most effective antidote for public employee strikes is to provide the
parties with a right to resolve their bargaining impasses through arbitration.
For example, in the most recent empirical study of the effects of interest
arbitration, Thomas Kochan and colleagues found that in the thirty years
following New York's adoption of interest arbitration for police and
firefighters, there was not a single complete work stoppage.14 In contrast,
despite very heavy penalties for illegal strikes and the availability of non-
binding fact-finding, New York experienced 33 teacher strikes during the
same period.15 Others have found similar effects of interest arbitration in
virtually eliminating public employee strikes. 16
Traditionally, discussions of interest arbitration have divided the process
into three models. Under conventional interest arbitration, the arbitrator is
empowered to issue an award adopting either party's final offer or crafting a
result between the final offers. Final offer package arbitration limits the
arbitrator to selecting the entire final offer of one of the parties. Final offer
issue-by-issue arbitration limits the arbitrator to selecting the final offer of
one of the parties with respect to each issue but allows the arbitrator to select
different parties' final offers with respect to different issues.17
This Article provides an alternative approach to the models of interest
arbitration. It suggests that interest arbitration may be viewed as a part of the
parties' collective bargaining process or it may be viewed as a method for
adjudicating disputes over terms and conditions of employment. Part II
discusses the relative advantages and drawbacks of reliance on a right to
strike versus reliance on interest arbitration as the primary method of impasse
resolution. It finds several disadvantages to interest arbitration. Part III
develops the competing models of interest arbitration as a part of the
12 Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact of Collective-Bargaining
Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May be the Worst
Legislation, 37 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1994); See also Robert Hedon & Robert Stem, Do
Public-Sector Strike Bans Really Prevent Conflict?, 42 INDUS. REL. 493, 505-507 (2003).
13 Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 361-79 (1993).
14 Thomas Kochan et al., The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case of
New York State's Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 565, 569 (2010).
15 Id. at 570.
16 See Malin, supra note 13, at 330 & n.79.
17 See MALIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 643-44.
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collective bargaining process and as a method of adjudication. Part IV
suggests that the adjudication model exacerbates the disadvantages of interest
arbitration. Part V concludes that interest arbitration should be regarded as a
part of the collective bargaining process and provides some consequences of
this conclusion.
II. RESOLVING PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING IMPASSES: STRIKES
VERSUS INTEREST ARBITRATION
As discussed above, a driving force behind public sector labor relations
legislation is the avoidance of public employee strikes and the strongest
antidote for public employee strikes is interest arbitration. Thus, in
determining what labor relations model to adopt, lawmakers have to evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of providing a right to strike versus
providing for interest arbitration.
A. Right to Strike
As the Boston Police strike demonstrated, some public employee strikes
can have devastating consequences for the public. It is not surprising that
strikes by police and firefighters are almost universally prohibited in the
United States,' 8 and that police and firefighters are the public sector
occupations most likely to have rights to interest arbitration.19 However, as
the 1981 air traffic controllers stiike demonstrated, employers and the public
are capable of coping with strikes that might intuitively appear to pose risks
of devastating consequences. Most strikes by public employees produce
inconvenience rather than disaster and tend to be of modest duration.
For example, in Illinois, public employee strikes occur predominantly in
public education. A large majority of those strikes are resolved in ten or
fewer days, with less than 10 percent taking more than 20 days to resolve. 20
Nevertheless, there are outliers which can cause major damage to the public
welfare. Since educational employees in Illinois gained the right to strike
effective January 1, 1984, there has been one such outlier; a strike by thirty
teachers against the Homer School District in rural Champaign County in
1986. The strike began on October 17, 1986, and did not end until after the
end of the school year. The resulting contract did not resolve two of the
18 But see Firefighters Local 1494 v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 586 P.2d 1346 (Idaho
1978) (holding firefighter strike after contract expiration not to be illegal).
19 See Malin, supra note 13, at 329 & n. 78.
20 Id. at 381. For updated data, see infra tbls 1 & 2.
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issues that precipitated the strike. The students lost essentially a year of
schooling, the school district lost considerable state aid and ultimately had to
merge with another district, and most of the striking teachers never returned
to their jobs. 21 Policymakers choosing between a right to strike and interest
arbitration must determine whether to run the risk of an outlier strike such as
Homer.
A second concern that has been voiced with respect to a right to strike for
public employees is that it distorts democratic processes. This concern was
raised most forcefully by Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter in their classic
work, The Unions and the Cities.22 Because issues concerning public
employees' wages and working conditions also raise issues of public policy,
Wellington and Winter cautioned, we must be concerned when unions are
given an avenue of access to public decisionmakers, collective bargaining,
that is not open to other interest groups. Coupling that exclusive avenue of
access with a right to strike greatly magnifies union political power because
when public employees strike, a large group of public officials' constituents
will clamor for a quick settlement and cause officials to concede to union
demands. Thus, granting public employees a right to strike excessively
empowers them in a decisionmaking process from which other interest
groups have been excluded. 23
Experience in the four decades since Wellington and Winter published
their thesis has not borne out their fears. Public officials have not
automatically caved into strikes and strike threats and the public has shown
itself to have greater resilience. 24 Depending on the political and economic
climate, strikes and strike threats can backfire on unions and unions appear to
recognize this and behave accordingly.25
21 See id. at 397-98; Tim Mitchell & Rebecca Mabry, Two Decades Later, Homer
Teachers Strike Still Sore Subject, THE NEWS-GAZETrE, (Dec. 12, 2006),
http://www.news-gazette.com/news/education/2006-11-12/two-decades-later-homer-
teachers-strike-still-sore-subject.html.
22 HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
(1971).
23 Id. at 24-29, 167-70, 202.
24 See Malin, supra note 13, at 321-25; Jeffrey H. Keefe, A Reconsideration and
Empirical Evaluation of Wellington's and Winter's The Unions and the Cities, paper
presented to The World Congress of the International Labor and Employment Relations
Ass'n, North American ISLSSL & International Ass'n of Labor Law Journals'
Workshop, Philadelphia, July 2, 2012, at 11 (observing that at the time of Wellington and
Winter's thesis only 0.1% of public employees had a right to strike but by 1990, 21% did
and suggesting that the growth in the right to strike indicates that it did not have the
catastrophic effects that Wellington & Winter predicted).
25 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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B. Interest Arbitration
Much of the literature assessing interest arbitration focuses on whether it
has a so-called "chilling effect" and "narcotic effect." The chilling effect
refers to the potential for interest arbitration to chill, i.e. inhibit, collective
bargaining. The theory is that parties will inflate their positions on the
assumption that an arbitrator will issue an award at a midpoint between the
parties' final offers. They will fear that making concessions in negotiations
will undermine their positions before the arbitrator. The narcotic effect refers
to the potential for parties who resolve their contract through interest
arbitration to use interest arbitration again to resolve future contracts. Interest
arbitration is said to be habit forming.
Most contracts negotiated under threat of going to interest arbitration
settle. That leads some to conclude that interest arbitration does not chill
collective bargaining. The rate of usage of interest arbitration, however,
exceeds the rate of resorting to strikes and a higher percentage of contracts
negotiated in right-to-strike regimes settle without a strike than the
percentage in interest arbitration regimes that settle without resort to
arbitration. Consequently, whether one believes that interest arbitration
chills bargaining depends on how one spins the data rather than on the data
itself.26
There is no consensus among the empirical studies with respect to the
narcotic effect of interest arbitration.27 Kochan and colleagues' recent study
of police and firefighter interest arbitration in New York State found that
usage rates declined from an average of 26% for firefighters and 31% for
police between 1974 and 1976 to averages of 7% for firefighters and 9% for
police between 1995 and 2007.28 They see the decreasing use of interest
arbitration as arguing against a narcotic effect,29 but also observe that several
cities, such as Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, are heavily dependent on
interest arbitration to establish their contracts. 30
The focus on alleged chilling and narcotic effects distracts from a more
serious drawback to interest arbitration, one that may account for the
process's higher usage rates and repeat customers. Resorting to interest
arbitration allows union leaders and public officials to avoid being held
accountable by their constituents. They can blame unfavorable or unpopular
26 See Malin, supra note 13, at 331 & ns 82-85.
27 See id. at 331-32 & n.86.
28 Kochan et al., supra note 14, at 570-71 & fig. 1.
29 Id. at 571.
30 Id.
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results on the arbitrator and avoid responsibility for hard decisions that they
might otherwise have to make in collective bargaining. Indeed, it is this lack
of accountability that has led a minority of courts to invalidate interest
arbitration statutes as improperly delegating governmental decisionmaking
authority to a private individual.31 To the extent that public officials and
union leaders are unable to resist the temptation to offload responsibility to
an arbitrator, arbitration usage rates will exceed strike rates and to the extent
that such offloading of responsibility successfully provides political shelter,
the parties will be tempted to repeat the exercise in subsequent negotiations.
Evidence from the current economic downturn strongly suggests that
interest arbitration is being used to avoid accountability for hard decisions. In
Illinois, almost all public employees except for law enforcement and fire
protection have a right to strike. Almost all strikes occur in pubic education.
Under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, before a union may
strike, it must give advance notice of intent to strike to the employer and the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.32 Table One presents data on
strikes and strike notices in the education sector in Illinois before and after
the economy crashed in 2008.33
Table One: Strikes and Strike Notices Under the IELRA
Year Strikes Strike Notices
1998-1999 9 43
1999-2000 9 43
2000-2001 7 50
2001-2002 10 40
2002-2003 7 47
2003-2004 10 46
2004-2005 4 36
2005-2006 5 36
2006-2007 3 24
2007-2008 9 34
2008-2009 1 11
2009-2010 4 13
2010-2011 2 23
2011-2012 5 19
31 See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. Super. Ct., 66 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2003).
32 115 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13 (2012).
33 All information concerning strikes and strike notices was provided to the author
by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board and is current as of June 21, 2012.
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One of the strikes in 2009-2010 was in higher education (at the
University of Illinois) and two of the strikes is 2011-2012 were in higher
education (at the University of Illinois at Chicago and Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale). Four strike notices that were not followed by
strikes in 2011-2012 were also in higher education (University of Illinois-
Springfield, Kennedy-King College, City Colleges of Chicago and Rock
Valley Community College) and four strike notices in 2010-2011 were in
higher education for different bargaining units at Southern Illinois University
- Carbondale, one of which led to the strike in 2011-2012.
Strikes in K-12 education are likely to be much more politically
sensitive than strikes in higher education. A strike at a state university or
local community college does not attract the attention of hundreds to tens of
thousands of parents, depending on the size of the school district, who
suddenly have to make alternate arrangements for their children. The data
makes clear that when the economy crashed, unions of educational
employees stopped striking. In the four school years since the economy
crashed, public K-12 education in Illinois has seen one strike in 2008-2009,
three in 2009-2010, two in 2010-2011 and three strikes in 2011-2012.
Moreover, as Table One makes clear, there has also been a dramatic decrease
in the number of strike notices. Except for an outlier year of 2006-2007 when
there were only twenty-four strike notices filed, the pre-2008 strike notices
ranged from thirty-two to fifty each year. In 2008-2009 there were only
eleven strike notices and there were only thirteen the following year.
Although the number increased in the following year, several of those were
in higher education; the number of K-12 strike notices dropped back the next
year and the numbers remained at least 50% below the number of notices in
the years prior to 2008. In other words, educational employees' unions were
not only refraining from striking, they weren't even threatening to strike.
Strike duration also changed markedly as the economy crashed. Table
Two presents data on strike duration obtained from the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board.
While strikes lasting a week or longer were common before the economy
crashed, strikes thereafter were generally settled in a matter of days with two
outliers (Ottawa Township High School and Illini Bluffs Community Unit
School District) as the only exceptions. This record is even more remarkable
considering the environment for K-12 negotiations. Although decreases in
government revenue generally lag the drop in the economy and the lag was
probably extended by the availability of federal stimulus money, it is likely
that by 2009-2010 and certainly by 2010-2011 that the parties were
negotiating in a concessionary environment.
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Table Two: Strike Duration under the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act
Year Employer Strike Days
2005-2006 Mendota CUSD 289 13
Farmington CUSD 265 5
Chicago Ridge SD 127.5 7
Trisco CUSD 176 4
Decatur SD 61 8
2006-2007 Wolf Branch Dist 113 8
Mendota Tsp HS Dist 280 1
Neoga CUSD 3 11
2007-2008 Hardin Co CUSD 1 13
Grundy County Spec Ed Coop (aides) 1
Grundy County Spec Ed Coop (sp ed ees) 3
Earlville CUSD 9 4
Nippersink SD 2 6
Cahokia CUSD 187 (sec/clerical) 9
Cahokia CUSD 187 (tchrs) 9
Cahokia CUSD 187 (service workers) 9
Harlem UD 122 5
2008-2009 Consolidated SD 158 1
2009-2010 Kankakee SD 11l 4
Ottawa Twp HS Dist 140 16
Prairie-Hills Elem SD 144 3
Univ. of Ill Unknown
2010-2011 Mahomet-Seymour CUSD 3 2
Danville CUSD 118 3
2011-2012 UIC 3
1 Illini Bluffs CUSD 327 6
Zion-Benton TWP HS 4
Rockford SD 205 2
SIU-C 5
In Ohio, most public sector employees also have a right to strike, but
must first utilize non-binding fact-finding. Strikes are allowed only if at least
one party rejects the fact-finder's recommended settlement by a super-
majority vote. 34 In Ohio, most public sector strikes occur in education,
although the predominance of education in public sector strike activity is not
as strong as in Illinois.35 Ohio had a total of 209 strikes during the fourteen
year period through Fiscal Year 2008, which ended on June 30, 2008, or an
34 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (c)(6)(A), (D)(2)(West 2012).
35 See [Ohio] State Empl. Rel. Board, Ann. Rep. 2010 at 11 (showing a total of 211
strikes since the Ohio public sector collective bargaining statute took effect on April 1,
1984 through 2010, of which 147 were in education).
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average of approximately fifteen strikes per year.36 As the economy declined,
so did the number of strikes, with only two in Fiscal Year 2009 and none in
Fiscal Year 2010.37 It appears that in Illinois and Ohio, parties bargaining
under a right-to-strike regime are taking responsibility for the hard decisions
necessary to conclude agreements in hard economic times.
The utilization rate for interest arbitration by Illinois public safety
workers paints a very different picture. 38 Proceeding to an interest arbitration
hearing is not as politically visible as threatening to or actually engaging in a
strike. Members of the public hit by layoffs, decreased hours of work, and
decreased income are not likely to notice a petition for interest arbitration
and certainly less likely to notice such a move as they are to notice and react
to a strike which closes their public schools. On the other hand, reductions in
government revenue can be expected to make police and firefighter
collective bargaining challenging. Consequently, the decisions necessary to
conclude a collective bargaining agreement probably became hardest when
federal stimulus money ran out in 2010. Table Three presents the data.
Table Three: Illinois Interest Arbitration for Law Enforcement and
Firefighters
Year Requests Arbitrator Awards No Award Open
Appointments on File
2005 67 26 11 15 0
2006 79 46 27 18 1
2007 73 38 19 19 0
2008 74 45 26 17 2
2009 74 51 27 18 6
2010 113 98 36 39 23
2011 98 75 7 10 58
The data reflect that as stimulus money was drying up in 2010, resort to
interest arbitration was increasing dramatically. Not only did filings increase
from seventy-four in the prior year to 113, but arbitrator appointments, i.e.,
cases that did not settle shortly after filing prior to appointment of an
arbitrator, just about doubled, from fifty-one to ninety-eight. Although the
number of filings and appointments declined in 2011, the number of
appointments was still 50% higher than what is was in 2009. This is not
surprising. In tough economic times, it is easier politically for union leaders
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 All information concerning interest arbitration was provided to the author by the
Illinois Labor Relations Board and is current as of February 3, 2012.
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to have arbitrators impose wage freezes or benefits concessions than for the
leaders to agree to them themselves. It is also politically easier for public
officials to have arbitrators impose wage increases and reject benefit
concessions than to agree to them themselves. Negotiators are less
accountable to their constituents in interest arbitration regimes than in right-
to-strike regimes.
A second drawback to interest arbitration derives from its inherently
conservative nature. In an early interest arbitration award, Arbitrator Whitney
McCoy summarized the interest arbitrator's role:
In submitting the case to arbitration, the parties have merely extended
their negotiations - they have left it to this board to determine what they
should, by negotiation, have agreed upon. We take it that the fundamental
inquiry, as to each issue, is: what should the parties themselves, as
reasonable men, have voluntarily agreed to?39
In other words, the interest arbitrator's task is to come up with the
contract that the parties would have agreed to had their negotiation process
not broken down. Of course, arbitrators are not mind readers. The best they
can do is search for objective indicators. The indicator most commonly
looked to by arbitrators is the agreements reached by comparable parties.
Except where expressly modified by statute, comparability tends to drive
interest arbitration awards, particularly with respect to wages and benefits.40
A second major indicator of what agreement the parties would have
reached had their negotiations not broken down is what agreements they
reached in the past. It is often said that there are no breakthroughs in interest
arbitration, that is that arbitrators are extremely reluctant to deviate from the
status quo.41 As Kochan and colleagues observed:
39 Twin Cities Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 845, 848 (1947) (McCoy,
Arb.).
40 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 1407 (Alan Miles Ruben ed
6th ed. 2003) ("Without question the most extensively used standard in interest
arbitration is 'prevailing practice.' [A]rbitrators, in effect, require the disputants
indirectly to adopt the end results of successful collective bargaining or arbitration
proceedings of other similarly situated parties."); Arvid Anderson et al., Public Sector
Interest Arbitration and Fact Finding: Standards and Procedures, in 2 LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 48.05(2) (Tim Bornstein, Ann Gosline & Marc D.
Greenbaum eds.) ("The most significant standard for interest arbitration in the public
sector is comparability of wages, hours and working conditions.").
41 See Malin, supra note 13, at 333-34.
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Experience demonstrates in New York and elsewhere that arbitrators
are reluctant to break new ground in their awards and would prefer to leave
innovative approaches to the parties. The conservative nature of arbitration
suggests that only in rare cases will significant changes be achieved on
critical contemporary issues if left to arbitrators to handle on a bargaining
unit level. 42
The conservative nature of interest arbitration may inhibit innovation in
collective bargaining. A party resisting change may do so knowing that it is
highly unlikely that an arbitrator will impose a change on an unwilling party.
The inhibition may be exacerbated in final offer package arbitration where a
party advocating a significant change may be likely to drop its proposals out
of fear that including them could prompt the arbitrator to award the other
party's package.
A third drawback to interest arbitration is its tendency to suppress and
redirect conflict rather than resolve conflict. Robert Hebdon and Robert Stem
compared pubic employee bargaining units in Ontario that had a right to
strike to those that instead used interest arbitration to resolve bargaining
impasses. 43 They found significantly higher rates of grievance arbitration in
units where strikes were prohibited and interest arbitration substituted.44 The
one exception arose in the few cases where there actually was a strike,
suggesting that where relations are poor, the conflict carries over from
contract negotiation to contract administration.45 However, in the general
case, they found, that prohibiting strikes and substituting interest arbitration,
rather than resolve conflict, primarily redirected it to contract administration
where grievance arbitration provided the next most effective conflict
mechanism.46 Hebdon found similarly that prohibiting strikes, with or
without interest arbitration, in the U.S. public sector led to significantly
greater rates of grievance arbitration and unfair labor practice proceedings. 47
Policymakers deciding whether to rely on a right to strike or interest
arbitration to resolve impasses in collective bargaining thus have to balance
the disadvantages of interest arbitration against the risks posed by strikes to
42 Kochan et al., supra note 14, at 582.
43 Robert P. Hebdon & Robert N. Stem, Tradeoffs Among Expressions of Industrial
Conflict: Public Sector Strike Bans and Grievance Arbitrations, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 204 (1998).
44 Id. at 214.
45 Id. at 215.
46 Id. at 217-18.
47 Bob Hebdon, Toward a Theory of Workplace Conflict: The Case of U.S.
Municipal Collective Bargaining, 14 ADVANCES IN INDUS. REL. 33, 60-61 (2005).
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the public welfare. With respect to law enforcement and fire protection, the
consensus choice is that the risks posed by strikes are unacceptable. The
consensus breaks down with respect to other public employees.
When policymakers decide that the risks of public sector strikes
outweigh the negative aspects of interest arbitration, they should be sensitive
to whether different models of interest arbitration ease or exacerbate those
negative aspects. The next section develops these models.
III. BARGAINING VERSUS ADJUDICATION MODELS OF INTEREST
ARBITRATION
Most discussions of models of interest arbitration focus on advantages
and disadvantages of the conventional, final offer package and final offer
issue-by-issue approaches. In this section, I suggest an alternative view of
diversity in interest arbitration. Interest arbitration may be conceived of as a
quasi-judicial adjudicatory proceeding or it may be conceived of as a
continuation of the collective bargaining process.
A. The Bargaining Model ofInterest Arbitration
Statutes that protect the right to strike do so on the assumption that a
robust right to strike will result in fewer strikes. In a right to strike statutory
scheme, the strike is something to be feared, not celebrated. Fear of the strike
reflects not only the loss of income experienced by the strikers and the
disruptions experienced by the employer, but also the unpredictability of the
strike. The desire to avoid strikes motivates parties to reach agreement at the
bargaining table. Assistance in reaching agreement is provided through third
party mediation. In right-to-strike regimes, strike threats, actual strikes and
mediation are part and parcel of the collective bargaining process.
Under a bargaining model of interest arbitration, interest arbitration
substitutes for the right to strike. As a strike substitute it is to be feared rather
than celebrated. The outcome of interest arbitration must be unpredictable so
that a mutual desire to avoid arbitration will motivate parties to work through
their differences and reach agreement on terms of a contract. Moreover, the
arbitrator serves to assist the parties in reaching agreement by mediating,
turning to arbitration and an imposed result as a last resort.
Although not essential to a bargaining model of interest arbitration, a
common feature is for the arbitration to be tri-partite, with each party
appointing a member of a three-arbitrator board chaired by a mutually-
selected neutral. Kochan and colleagues describe how such a model operates
in New York State:
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In virtually all arbitration cases in New York, after the formal hearings
are concluded, the tripartite panel goes into "executive session," where
negotiation and mediation are common features of the process. In some
cases these negotiations often produce a settlement or a unanimous award.
In other cases, the negotiations serve to narrow the differences between the
parties on some of the issues but not sufficiently to produce a unanimous
award. The arbitrators we interviewed also told us that executive sessions
sometimes resulted in tacit agreements, but political factors dictated the
need for the neutral chair to write an award and for one of the parties to
offer a dissent.4 8
Another strong example of interest arbitration as a part of the bargaining
process is police and firefighter arbitration in Pennsylvania. Like its
counterpart in New York, Pennsylvania police and firefighter interest
arbitration is tri-partite.4 9 Following the formal hearing, the three arbitrators
meet in executive session where "the neutral will wheedle and arm-twist,
exhort and extort, sometimes with both party-appointed arbitrators present,
sometimes in separate caucuses, in the effort to achieve, to the greatest extent
possible, a consensus among his or her party-appointed colleagues."50 The
resulting award that is the product of a compromise among the parties
represented by their partisan members of the panel, merely sets forth the
terms without any supporting rationale and without disclosing actual votes
among the panel. 5 1
Pennsylvania's system encourages the parties to continue the bargaining
process and the effort to optimize the outcome for both sides at the
arbitration stage. By establishing a tripartite panel, the statute empowers
and suggests that the neutral seek to craft a compromise between his or her
colleagues on the panel. The bare bones procedure, requiring only that the
neutral obtain a second vote, without mandating a selection between the
parties' "final" offers, either on an overall or issue-by-issue basis, enables
the neutral to promote compromises among the party-appointed arbitrators.
The absence of a requirement for a written opinion, and the custom of
forgoing one, furthers the mediation mindset. Requiring a rationale for the
outcome makes the neutral arbitrator the author and thereby the owner of
the award. In Pennsylvania, there may not be a rationale, other than that the
48 Kochan et al., supra note 14, at 580.
49 Matthew M. Franckiewicz, Interest Arbitration in Pennsylvania, in ARBITRATION
2009: DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 62D ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 145, 147 (Paul D. Staudohar ed., 2010).
50 Id. at 149.
51 Id. at 150.
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outcome was one that both party appointed arbitrators believed their clients
could live with. 52
B. The Adjudication Model ofInterest Arbitration
Many interest arbitration statutes convey the impression that they are
establishing systems of adjudication rather than collective bargaining. They
often specify the factors that arbitrators shall apply in crafting their awards, 53
and some direct the relative weight to be applied to the listed factors.54 Some
temper the statutory push toward an adjudication model by expressly
authorizing the arbitrator to mediate55 and to remand to the parties for further
negotiations, 56 while others expressly prohibit the arbitrator from
mediating. 57
One of the most forceful advocates of interest arbitration as an
adjudicatory process was highly regarded arbitrator and former chair of the
Federal Service Impasses Panel and Michigan Employment Relations
Commission Robert Howlett. Howlett urged substituting interest arbitration
for strikes and lockouts for all collective bargaining impasses:
In this country when there is a controversy or impasse between
individuals or enterprises, the controversy is resolved through a judicial or
quasi-judicial procedure. Labor disputes involving representation issues and
unfair labor practices are submitted to such procedures. It is only in
collective bargaining that resolution is through trial by combat.
Should not we, in this country, have become sufficiently civilized so
that collective bargaining impasses, in both the public and private sectors,
are to be settled by judicial or quasi-judicial procedures rather than through
trial by combat? 58
52 Id. (emphasis in Original).
53 See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/14(h) (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22(7)
(West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:13A-16(g) (West 2012); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.14(g)(7) (West 2012).
54 See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §423.239 (West 2012); OR. REv. STAT. §
243.746(4) (West 2012).
55 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16(f)(3) (West 2012).
56 See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/14(f) (West 2012).
57 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22(7) (West 2012).
58 Robert G. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 815, 836-37 (1984).
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Howlett expressed his lack of concern for the effects such an
adjudicatory approach to interest arbitration would have on the collective
bargaining process. "If the public interest is better served by interest
arbitration than by collective bargaining, damage to collective bargaining is
immaterial." 59
To find a marked contrast to Pennsylvania's approach to police and
firefighter interest arbitration, one need only go across the Delaware River to
New Jersey. In contrast with Pennsylvania which employs a tri-partite
arbitration panel, the New Jersey statute for police and firefighter arbitration
relies on a single neutral arbitrator.60 Whereas in Pennsylvania the award, if
any, is the product of mediation among the neutral and the two party-
appointed arbitrators, in New Jersey, an arbitrator who mediates must be
careful to separate the mediation from the adjudication that produces an
award.
In Township of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association Local
16361 the arbitrator, with the agreement of the parties, mediated their dispute
before commencing a formal hearing. Mediation was not successful and the
matter proceeded to a formal hearing. 62 Ultimately, the arbitrator adopted the
union's final offer with respect to the economic issues in dispute.63 In so
doing, the arbitrator made reference to information provided during the
mediation, which had not been introduced at the formal arbitration hearing,
and to the employer's conduct during the mediation. New Jersey's
intermediate appellate court vacated the award. 64
The court observed that interest arbitration is significantly different from
grievance arbitration. The former is more formal, arbitrators have less
discretion and are constrained by statutory standards and their awards are
subject to a more stringent standard of judicial review.65 The court
recognized that the statute expressly authorizes arbitrators to mediate.66
Nevertheless, the court analogized the arbitrator to a trial court judge and
mediation to pre-trial settlement negotiations, declaring that "it would be
59 Robert G. Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U.
CIN. L. REv. 47, 57 (1973).
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16(e)(1) (West 2012).
61 Township of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association Local 163, 669
A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996).
62 Id. at 291-92.
63 Id. at 292.
64 Id. at 292.
65 Township of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association Local 163, 669
A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996).
66 Id. at 294 (citing 34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13A-16(f)(3) (West 2012)).
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unthinkable for a trial court to base its decision on information disclosed in
pretrial settlement negotiations." 67 The court thus regarded interest
arbitration as an adjudicatory process that stands apart from rather than as a
part of the collective bargaining process.
In Pennsylvania, the arbitration award that typically results from the
mediation process consists of a listing of the terms imposed on the parties
and a generic statement that each term received the votes of at least a
majority of the panel. Such an approach would be invalid in New Jersey.
The New Jersey statute specifies factors that interest arbitrators are to
weigh in reaching their awards.68 In Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of
Hillsdale,69 the parties proceeded to interest arbitration over two issues,
salary increases and the banking of compensatory time beyond a calendar
year.70 Evidence and arguments presented to the arbitrator focused on the
wages and benefits paid to police officers in comparable communities and the
financial impact of each party's final offer on the employer's fisc.71 The
arbitrator based his award on comparability and a finding that the employer
had the ability to pay for the union's final offer.72 The court held that, in so
doing, the award was flawed.
The court interpreted the statute as mandating that the arbitrator address
every factor listed therein. Although the arbitrator need not rely on every
factor in deciding the case, an arbitrator who finds some of the statutory
factors irrelevant must explain why.73 Such a requirement, inter alia, enables
a reviewing court to determine whether the arbitrator's resolution of the
issues was reasonable and gave due weight to the relevant factors. 74
Thus, the New Jersey courts appear to regard interest arbitration as an
adjudicatory process akin to a trial or administrative agency hearing, rather
than a continuation of the collective bargaining process. A 1996 amendment
to the New Jersey statute codified Borough of Hillsdale by requiring the
arbitrator to "indicate which of the [statutory] factors are deemed relevant,
satisfactorily explain why the others are not relevant, and provide an analysis
of the evidence on each relevant factor."75 The 1996 amendment also
67 Id.
68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16(g) (West 2012).
69 Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of Hillsdale, 644 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1994).
70 Id. at 567.
71 Id. at 568.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 570-72.
74 Id. at 571.
75 MALIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 674 (discussing 1996 amendment).
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directed arbitrators how to apply the statutory factor of "financial impact on
the governing unit, its residents, and taxpayers." 76
An amendment enacted in December 2010 further solidified New
Jersey's police and firefighter interest arbitration as adjudicatory in nature,
rather than a continuation of the collective bargaining process.77 The
Amendment eliminated party selection of the arbitrator; now the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC) randomly selects the arbitrator
from a special panel. Under the Amendment, when a party petitions for
interest arbitration, mediation is terminated. Additionally, the parties must
present written estimates of the financial impact of their final offers, and the
award must issue within forty-five days of arbitrator appointment-prior law
allowed 120 days. The award must address all statutory criteria and certify
that the arbitrator took statutory limitations imposed by the local levy cap
into account. The award may be appealed to PERC, which must: decide the
appeal within thirty days, address all statutory factors, and certify that it took
the levy cap into account. The statute caps arbitrator fees at $1,000 per day
and $7,500 total, and it caps cancellation fees at $500; it fines arbitrators
$1,000 per day for being late. The award may not increase base salary items
by more than two percent of the aggregate amount expended by the employer
in the twelve months immediately preceding expiration of the prior contract,
and may not include base salary items and other economic issues that were
not included in prior contract.78 The cap on base salaries sunsets on April 1,
2014.79
In 2011, Nebraska amended its interest arbitration statute in a manner
that resembles an adjudicatory rate-making proceeding rather than a
continuation of the collective bargaining process. In Nebraska, the
Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), whose members are appointed by
the Governor, performs interest arbitration. The new Nebraska Act provides
detailed criteria for selecting an array of comparable communities and
specifies the number of comparable communities to be selected. It mandates
that if the employer pays compensation that is between 98% and 102% of the
76 Id.
77 2010 N.J. Laws, ch. 105; see BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION ON THE POLICE AND FIRE PUBLIC INTEREST
ARBITRATION REFORM ACT AS AMENDED BY P.L. 2010 c.105 at 4-6 (2012) (describing
the amendment's changes).
78 2010 N.J. Laws, ch. 105; see BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION ON THE POLICE AND FIRE PUBLIC INTEREST
ARBITRATION REFORM ACT AS AMENDED BY P.L. 2010 c.105 at 4-6 (2012) (describing
the amendment's changes).
79 Id.
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average of the comparables, including fringe benefits, the CIR must leave
compensation unchanged. If the employer's compensation is below 98% of
the average, the CIR is to raise it to 98%; and if it is above 102%, the CIR is
to lower it to 102%. The targets are reduced to 95 -100% during periods of
recession, defined as two consecutive quarters in which the state's net sales,
use taxes, and individual and corporate income tax receipts are below those
of the prior year.80
The tendency to regard interest arbitration as an adjudicatory rather than
a collective bargaining process is not only of recent vintage. For example, in
1978, the Massachusetts legislature significantly changed the interest
arbitration procedure for the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority
(MBTA).81
As in most cities, rapid transit in Boston originally was provided by a
private company. Since 1912, employees of the company, the Boston
Elevated Railway, were represented by Amalgamated Transit Union Local
589. In 1947, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), the predecessor
agency to the MBTA, acquired the Boston Elevated Railway. The MTA's
enabling legislation authorized it to bargain collectively and to arbitrate
unresolved disputes. 82 The Massachusetts legislature created the MBTA in
1964 as a successor to the MTA, that was qualified to receive federal funds
under the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA). 83 Section 13(c) of
UMTA required that as a condition of the receipt of federal funds, the state
must assure the Secretary of Labor that fair and equitable arrangements have
been made to protect, among other things, the collective bargaining rights of
the employees affected by the federal funds. 84
For decades, the MBTA and its predecessor agency had in their
collective bargaining agreements with Local 589 a provision that disputes
over the negotiation of successor agreements would be submitted to a tri-
partite arbitration board, consisting of one arbitrator appointed by each party
and a mutually selected neutral chair with experience in transit arbitration.
The agreement did not specify criteria on which the board was required to
base its decision. This process came in for public criticism, focused on the
80 L.B. 397, 102d Leg. (Neb. 2011) (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-804, §48-
818(2012)).
81 1 gratefully acknowledge Philip Boyle, Esq., of Morgan, Brown & Joy, LLP, who
represented the MBTA for many years, for providing me with background on the 1978
statute.
82 See Local Div., 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618,
620 & n. 1 (1st Cir. 1981).
83See id. at 620 n.2.
84 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1988).
163
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tri-partite nature of the arbitration and the lack of any requirement that the
neutral be a resident of Massachusetts or have any experience in state and
local government finance. The process was portrayed as resulting in
continuous expansion of wages and benefits to levels that were out of sync
with those of other public employees in the state.85
As a result, chapter 405 of the Massachusetts Acts of 1978, among other
things, abolished the tri-partite arbitration panel, replacing it with a single
arbitrator who had to be a Massachusetts resident experienced in state and
local finance. Local 589 complained to the Secretary of Labor that the
statutory changes were inconsistent with the assurances that the State had
provided pursuant to UMTA. The Labor Department responded that the
complaint raised issues of interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and suggested that such issues be resolved under the agreement's
arbitration provision. An arbitration ensued before William J. Fallon, which
presented the question, "Whether the 1978 Amendments to Chapter 161A of
the General Laws and the insistence of the MBTA in arbitrating interests
disputes in accordance with those amendments, are in conflict with the 13(C)
Agreements of the parties?"8 6
In answering that question in the affirmative, Arbitrator Fallon found that
the statutory amendments changed the fundamental nature of the MBTA
interest arbitration proceeding from part of the collective bargaining process
to an adjudicatory process. He focused, inter alia, on the substitution of a
single arbitrator for the tri-partite board:
Requiring interest arbitration before a single arbitrator rather than a
tripartite board with a neutral and two partisan arbitrators, also represents an
impairment in the collective bargaining provisions protected by the 13(C)
agreement. The input of the partisan arbitrators to achieve an award that is
reasonably acceptable, represents an irreparable loss to the process and
converts it into more of an adversary proceeding than the extension of the
collective bargaining process that it was.87
Tri-partite boards facilitate the use of interest arbitration as a
continuation of the bargaining process, but they are not essential for interest
arbitration to perform that role. The Federal Service Labor Management
Relations Statute, which governs collective bargaining between federal
85 E-mail from Philip Boyle, Esq., Morgan, Brown & Joy, LLP, to author (Feb. 8,
2012).
86 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Auth. and Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit
Union, Dispute Re: 13(C) Agreement 1 (Aug. 13, 1979) (Fallon Arb.).
8 71 d at 28-29.
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agencies and unions representing agency employees, provides for parties to
first resort to mediation to resolve impasses in collective bargaining. If
mediation fails to resolve the impasse, either party may seek assistance from
the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP).88 The statute empowers FSIP to
"assist the parties through whatever methods and procedures . . . it may
consider appropriate," 89and if that assistance does not produce settlement, to
"take whatever action is necessary . .. to resolve the impasse." 90
One of the procedures FSIP uses is to delegate authority to an individual
FSIP member to conduct a hybrid mediation-arbitration procedure, where the
member mediates but if mediation fails to produce agreement, arbitrates and
imposes terms. 91 In my experience as a FSIP member, I have found this
procedure-even though conducted by a single neutral rather than a tri-
partite board-to be an effective means of integrating interest arbitration into
the parties' collective bargaining process.
The two models of interest arbitration developed in this section should be
considered end points on a continuum. Most interest arbitration processes fall
somewhere along the continuum, rather than at the ends. The next section
evaluates the two models and urges that interest arbitration processes be
structured to fall closer to the bargaining end of the continuum, rather than
the adjudication end.
IV. EVALUATING THE MODELS
As developed previously, 92 the disadvantages of interest arbitration of
primary policy concern are: its use as a means by which union leaders and
public officials can avoid accountability to their constituents for the hard
decisions necessary to conclude an agreement, its inherently conservative
nature which stifles innovation, and its tendency to divert rather than resolve
conflict. Intuitively, it would appear that to the extent the arbitration process,
or more precisely the mutual desire to avoid an arbitrated resolution,
motivates the parties to reach an agreement, these drawbacks are mitigated.
When negotiators agree on the terms of the new contract, union leaders
and public officials are accountable to their constituents for the decisions
they have made. They are unable to blame an arbitrator for imposing terms
88 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1) (2006).
89 Id. § 71 19(c)(5)(A)(ii).
90 Id. § 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii).
91 A GUIDE: To DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES USED BY THE FEDERAL SERVICE
IMPASSES PANEL, available at http://www.flra.gov/fsipdrpg.
92 See supra Part II.B.
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on them.93 Furthermore, because arbitrators are very reluctant to deviate from
the status quo in their awards, change and innovation will come only by
agreement of the parties' negotiators. Finally, to the extent that bargaining
issues are resolved by agreement, the parties' conflict is resolved rather than
diverted to other forums such as grievance arbitration and unfair labor
practice proceedings.
As a part of the parties' collective bargaining process, interest arbitration
provides a substitute for the right to strike. Agreements are reached in right-
to-strike regimes because the parties mutually desire to avoid such economic
warfare, in part because strikes are inherently unpredictable. Thus, for the
threat to go to interest arbitration to function comparably to the threat of
strike, the outcome of an arbitration proceeding should also be unpredictable.
The further along the continuum toward an adjudicatory process the
interest arbitration proceeding is situated, the more predictable the outcome
will be. Statutory mandates, such as those found in New Jersey, that the
arbitrator consider statutorily enumerated factors and explain in a written
award how each factor was evaluated and if a factor was deemed irrelevant
why, makes the outcome more predictable. Predictability is enhanced further
if the award is subject to a robust standard of judicial review. Over time, a
body of case law will develop that sets established precedents for parties to
apply in subsequent proceedings.
It is often believed that greater predictability increases the likelihood of
settlement in litigation. Why spend the resources to litigate if only to achieve
a predictable result that is otherwise available through a settlement? But in
collective bargaining, predictability of arbitration outcomes may actually
inhibit resolution by agreement. Why enter into and thereby allow oneself to
be held accountable for an agreement, if the arbitrator is likely to impose an
expected result and can then be blamed for the outcome? The temptation to
leave the resolution to the arbitrator will be even greater if a robust standard
of judicial review enables the recipient of an award that deviates from the
expected result to appeal, and have a reasonable chance of having the
deviation corrected.
The more the interest arbitration process resembles adjudication rather
than collective bargaining, the less likely it will be that the parties will
resolve their conflicts by agreement. The emerging data from New Jersey
since the 2010 amendments provides initial, if tentative, support for this
proposition. Table Four presents the data available from the New Jersey
PERC.
93 Of course, that is not the case when the agreed-on terms are presented to the
constituents in the form of an award, unless the award states that it is an agreed-on award.
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It is apparent that the settlement rate decreased markedly in 2011 and
2012, after the new law took effect. We cannot say whether and, if so to what
extent, the 2010 enactment inhibited settlement because many of the cases
resolved in 2011 and 2012 were begun prior to the effective date of the 2010
amendment, and thus were handled under the old law. 94 However, there are
many reasons to believe that the 2010 amendments are inhibiting resolution
by agreement.
Table Four: New Jersey Interest Arbitration Experience Since 199395
Year Number of Number of Number of
Awards Appeals Settlements
2012 (thru 4/30/12) 9 5 10
2011 34 13 38
2010 16 9 45
2009 16 5 45
2008 15 2 60
2007 16 1 46
2006 13 3 55
2005 11 0 54
2004 27 2 55
2003 23 2 40
2002 16 0 45
2001 17 0 35
2000 24 0 60
1999 25 0 45
1998 41 2 42
1997 37 4 62
1996 21 2 35
1995 37 0 44
1994 35 0 56
1993 46 0 66
94 PERC's website reports the number of awards in 2011 and 2012 that were subject
to the new law, see New Jersey Interest Arbitration Experience Since 1993,
http://www.state.nj.us/perc/NJ PERC SalaryIncreaseAnalysisIA_1993.01.01_-
_2012.04.30.pdf.but it is not clear what that means. The new procedures took effect for
arbitration petitions filed after January 1, 2011, but the new law's cap on increases in
base wages applies only to contracts expiring after January 1, 2011. It is not clear
whether the numbers reported by PERC are for awards resulting from the new procedures
or awards subject to the cap on base wage increases.
95 Id.
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First, the 2010 amendments cut off existing dispute resolution
mechanisms, particularly mediation, when an interest arbitration petition is
filed. Although the statute continues to authorize the arbitrator to mediate, the
new procedures make it far less likely that such mediation will occur. The
amendments treat the arbitration proceeding like a judicial or administrative
agency proceeding in an important respect: just as the litigants in court or
before an administrative agency are unable to select their judge or
administrative hearing officer, under the new interest arbitration procedures,
the parties are not allowed to select their arbitrator. Instead, PERC appoints
the arbitrator by random selection. This means that if the parties are dealing
with an arbitrator who they both trust to mediate they are doing so by chance
rather than by design. Furthermore, even where the parties have sufficient
confidence in the arbitrator to welcome arbitral mediation, the 2010
amendments make it highly unlikely that such mediation will occur. This is
because the arbitrator must conduct a hearing, receive the parties' arguments
and issue an award within forty-five days of the arbitrator's appointment or
face a fine of $1,000 per day that the award is late. Such a time frame simply
leaves no time for mediation. It is possible that the reduced settlement rates
for 2011 and the beginning of 2012 will turn out to be aberrations,
comparable to the aberration experienced in 1998, but it is more likely that
the pattern will continue, and perhaps worsen, as the amended procedures
completely take hold.
V. CONCLUSION
The fear of granting public employees a right to strike, a fear that except
for law enforcement personnel and firefighters is largely unjustified, has led
to the substitution of interest arbitration as a method for resolving impasses
in collective bargaining. But interest arbitration has significant drawbacks. It
enables negotiators to avoid responsibility and accountability to their
constituents. It is an inherently conservative process that inhibits innovative
solutions, and it tends to divert rather than resolve conflict.
Approaches to interest arbitration may be situated along a continuum
from being a part of the parties' collective bargaining process to being a
separate adjudicatory proceeding. The more an arbitration process is
developed as part of the overall collective bargaining process, the more likely
the process will ease the disadvantages of interest arbitration. The more an
arbitration process is developed as an adjudication process, the more likely it
will exacerbate the disadvantages of interest arbitration.
To develop the interest arbitration process as an extension of the
collective bargaining process, policymakers should encourage arbitrators to
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mediate. Sufficient time should be allotted in establishing deadlines for the
arbitration award to allow for mediation, and the parties should be authorized
to extend those deadlines by agreement. The arbitrator should have authority
to remand the dispute to the parties for further negotiations if the arbitrator
determines that such a remand is appropriate. Tri-partite arbitration boards
facilitate mediation but are not essential, as effective mediation can occur
even where there is a single, neutral arbitrator.
Interest arbitration statutes should be designed such that the outcome of
an arbitration proceeding will be unpredictable. Where statutes specify
factors for the arbitrator to consider, something that may be necessary in
many states to avoid having the statute voided as an unconstitutional
delegation of sovereign authority, 96 the factors should be worded broadly to
give the arbitrator as much discretion as possible. Prioritizing some factors
over others should be avoided and the list should contain express
authorization for the arbitrator to consider factors in addition to those
expressly listed. Arbitrators should not be required to address expressly every
factor; indeed, as with grievance arbitration, they should not be required to
provide detailed reasons for their awards. At most, they should be required to
indicate that they have considered all relevant factors in reaching the
decision.
Judicial review of interest arbitration awards should be extremely
narrow. As long as the arbitrator acted within the scope of his or her
authority, was not biased and did not engage in willful misconduct, a
reviewing court or administrative agency should defer to the award. The goal
of interest arbitration should be to resolve a particular dispute, not to develop
a body of precedent binding on future adjudications.
When interest arbitration is situated as an extension of the collective
bargaining process, the disadvantages of resolving bargaining impasses
through arbitration will be mitigated. Parties are more likely to reach
agreement and, in so doing, have a better chance of innovating rather than
replicating the status quo, and of resolving conflict rather than diverting it to
contract administration. When parties resolve their bargaining disputes by
agreement, they own the resolution and cannot avoid accountability by
pushing responsibility off on the arbitrator.
169
96 See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206,
211 (R.I. 1969).
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